Did protective tariffs truly lead to the Civil War? This question is one that nearly every enthusiast of the era encounters, standing as one of the most controversial and misunderstood debates surrounding the roots of secession, exactly 150 years ago.
The debate around tariffs is contentious because it can appear to downplay slavery’s critical role in the Civil War’s origins. In this simplified view, the argument can be countered by South Carolina’s Declaration of Immediate Causes, which cited “an increasing hostility on the part of the non-slaveholding States to the institution of slavery” as its motivation for secession. However, while tariffs may not have been primary, dismissing their role entirely would be hasty.
James W. Loewen, a sociologist, sought to clarify this in his recent Washington Post article, labeling tariffs as one of the Civil War’s “5 myths.” This piece sparked a vibrant debate across the historical blogosphere, prompting economist Thomas DiLorenzo to issue a strong rebuttal. Loewen doubled down on his stance at HNN, reinforcing his initial arguments without fully addressing criticisms. His core claim is summarized in the Washington Post.
Robert Penn Warren succinctly stated that the “Tariff Thesis is flatly wrong.” He pointed out that while high tariffs had triggered the Nullification Crisis of 1831-33, when South Carolina threatened secession if it couldn’t nullify federal laws, no other states joined in, and President Andrew Jackson’s readiness to use force prompted South Carolina to retreat. Warren argued that tariffs were irrelevant by 1860 since Southern states had crafted the low Tariff of 1857, which had reduced rates to their lowest since 1816.
Yet, this view overlooks some significant factors. As I explored in a recent article in the Journal of the Early Republic, to claim tariffs were not a factor in 1860 is, in itself, “flatly wrong.” Southern concern was not over the Tariff of 1857 but rather the looming Morrill Tariff of 1861, a divisive issue in Congress for nearly two years and central to the 1860 election. The roots of the Nullification Crisis, which included debates predating 1828 South Carolina, and even Thomas Jefferson’s influence, deserve a separate discussion. But the Morrill Tariff, with its real-time relevance, demands a closer look.
The historiography of the Morrill Tariff has been clouded, particularly by “Lost Cause” revisionism, as James W. Loewen noted. Robert Penn Warren’s centennial essay on the war further discusses how, after the 19th century, many former slaveholders found it convenient to reinterpret the war as a tariff dispute rather than a conflict over slavery. This revisionist interpretation, however, should not overshadow the factual history of the tariff debate itself.
So, where did the tariff debate stand on the eve of the Civil War? Like many other political issues of the time, it had become embroiled in a North-South conflict, fueling sectional divisions that ran deeper than any single policy.
The Impact of the Morrill Tariff
For years before the Civil War, tariffs remained relatively stable, thanks to the Walker Tariff of 1846, an American counterpart to Britain’s repeal of the Corn Laws. This tariff helped maintain a balance that favored free trade, a priority for Southern and Western agricultural interests. In 1857, they managed to secure an even further reduction, led by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Robert M.T. Hunter of Virginia.
However, the Panic of 1857 shook this balance. While primarily triggered by international agricultural price fluctuations, the Panic revitalized the struggling protectionist movement, which called for high tariffs as a fix for the economic downturn. Tariffs quickly surged to the forefront of national policy discussions, joining the uproar around the Dred Scott decision. By 1858, tariffs were a core issue in the election for Speaker of the House. Historian Richard Franklin Bensel notes that Southern opposition to tariff hikes clashed with Republican John Sherman’s protectionist stance, creating a deadlock that persisted for over two months. Ultimately, Sherman withdrew, assuming the chairmanship of the Ways and Means Committee as a compromise, where he joined forces with Rep. Justin Morrill of Vermont to draft a new, highly protectionist tariff proposal, sparking fierce debates in the House. The Morrill Tariff eventually passed in May 1860, dividing lawmakers along North-South lines.
Senator Hunter then moved to table the tariff in the Senate, ensuring it would emerge as a divisive issue in the 1860 election. This delay shifted the final Senate vote to the “Secession Winter” of 1860-61, the period that marked the beginning of the Civil War.
While the national debate over slavery dominated the 1860 election, the Morrill Tariff bill emerged as a key issue within the Republican Party, especially in the Northeast. Abraham Lincoln’s long-standing image as a “Tariff Whig” proved influential in securing his nomination, particularly in attracting the protectionist-leaning delegates initially pledged to Senator Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania during the Republican Convention in Chicago. After clinching the nomination, Lincoln dispatched his campaign manager, David Davis, to Pennsylvania and New Jersey with a suite of pro-tariff speeches to secure the vital protectionist vote in these pivotal swing states. Morrill and Sherman joined as Lincoln’s surrogates, campaigning through Pennsylvania, while Lincoln himself focused on the Midwest, where excessive pro-tariff rhetoric could risk alienating voters. Lincoln’s clever electoral strategy ultimately paid off.
When Congress reconvened in December for what would be known as “Secession Winter,” Southern Democrats, especially the pro-slavery “fire-eaters,” initiated the session with fierce attacks on Lincoln’s platform—not one aimed at abolishing slavery but merely at containing its spread. Against this backdrop of rising secessionist fervor, the Morrill Tariff bill arrived in the Senate, intensifying the tense climate of that pivotal winter.
Tariffs and the Road to Secession
The relationship between the Morrill Tariff and secession has been a subject of intense debate since 1860-61, with some figures of that era even taking part in the discussions themselves. Much of the immediate controversy revolved around whether the Morrill Tariff had a chance of passing either in the final days of the outgoing Congress or in the new Senate under Lincoln’s administration. This question remains unanswered, as the resignations of senators from six secessionist states on January 21, 1861, also removed crucial votes likely opposed to the tariff, allowing its passage with minimal resistance a month later.
Contrary to claims in Loewen’s article, it’s clear that secessionists seriously considered and debated the tariff. Though slavery was the predominant issue, discussions around tariffs surfaced as a secondary point. The territorial question and “fire-eater” hostility toward abolitionists overshadowed secession conventions in the seven original Confederate states, yet grievances about the Morrill Tariff also surfaced. For instance, on December 25, 1860, South Carolina’s secession convention called on other Southern states to join, citing “the consolidation of the North to rule the South, by the tariff and slavery issues.”
Neighboring Georgia held even deeper discussions on the tariff. Alexander Stephens, who would later serve as the Confederate Vice President yet initially opposed secession, argued that if Southern and Western agricultural states stayed in the Union, they could amass enough votes to defeat the tariff in the Senate. Senator Robert Toombs, soon to be the Confederate Secretary of State, condemned the Morrill Tariff as “the most atrocious tariff bill that was ever enacted,” increasing duties from twenty to two hundred and fifty percent. Toombs continued his criticism, even incorporating an anti-tariff clause into Georgia’s pro-slavery Declaration of Causes for secession.
Considering the full spectrum of evidence, it’s challenging to assert that tariffs alone drove the secession crisis; most historians who subscribe to the tariff thesis today don’t make this claim. Consequently, dismissing all discourse on tariffs due to their later association with “Lost Cause” historiography risks creating a strawman argument. Some historians attacking the tariff thesis fall into this trap. Tariff politics have always been complex, necessitating both political insight and economic analysis. The tariff undoubtedly played a role on the eve of the Civil War, and dismissing it entirely without careful consideration oversimplifies the crisis and deprives us of a fuller understanding of this period.
A balanced, evidence-based view of the tariff issue reveals its resurgence from 1858 to 1861 as political tensions escalated and pre-war sectional divides intensified. It contributed significantly to these divisions, arriving in the Senate during the “Secession Winter” and further stirring an already volatile situation. While the tariff alone cannot fully explain the Civil War, it represents the conflict’s layered nature. Complex upheavals rarely boil down to one issue, and tariffs exemplify how economic concerns intersected with the moral and sectional issues of slavery.
Next in our “Civil War at 150” series: exploring the intellectual roots of Abolitionism.
Written by Phil Magness