Did protective tariffs play a role in causing the Civil War? This question, common among Civil War enthusiasts, touches on one of the most controversial and misunderstood debates about the causes of secession 150 years ago.
The “tariff thesis” is often contentious because it can be seen as shifting focus away from slavery as the core cause of the war. A straightforward dismissal of this view would point to South Carolina’s Declaration of Immediate Causes, which specifically cited “an increasing hostility on the part of the non-slaveholding States to the institution of slavery” as its reason for secession. Yet, dismissing tariffs entirely from discussions of Civil War causality overlooks the issue’s nuanced role.
In a recent Washington Post article, sociologist James W. Loewen argued that tariffs are one of the “5 myths” of the Civil War. His article sparked a lively online debate, with economist Thomas DiLorenzo, a fellow Austrian School thinker, issuing a strong rebuttal. Loewen, responding on HNN, defended his stance with minimal adjustment to his original claims. Loewen’s position in the Washington Post states that the tariff thesis is “flatly wrong,” noting that high tariffs sparked the Nullification Crisis of 1831-33. During that crisis, South Carolina demanded the right to nullify federal laws, but ultimately backed down when President Andrew Jackson threatened force. By 1860, Loewen argues, tariffs were no longer a prominent issue, as Southern leaders themselves had set the nation’s low tariffs in 1857, reducing rates to their lowest levels since 1816.
Several critical flaws emerge with this perspective. Claiming that tariffs held no significance in 1860 is itself “flatly wrong,” as I discussed in a recent article in the Journal of the Early Republic. The Morrill Tariff of 1861, not the 1857 Tariff, was at the heart of Southern frustrations, fueling a fierce political struggle in Congress for nearly two years and making it a central issue in the 1860 presidential election. While the Nullification Crisis is an extensive and intricate topic involving not only South Carolinians of 1828-33 but also earlier figures like Thomas Jefferson, the urgency of the tariff debate before the Civil War calls for attention here.
The Morrill Tariff’s history is further complicated by its treatment in post-war historiography. Loewen, for example, points out how elements of the “Lost Cause” narrative absorbed the tariff thesis, a point Robert Penn Warren explored in his centennial essay on the Civil War. By the late 1800s, with slavery as a cause fading from public favor, some former slaveholders reframed the war around tariffs—an issue already central to the national political debate of the time. However, understanding “Lost Cause” interpretations should not overshadow the real historical impact of the tariff.
So, what role did the tariff play on the brink of the Civil War? As with much of the era’s politics, it lay at the core of a tangled and contentious political landscape, sharply dividing North and South along sectional lines.
The Morrill Tariff: Catalyst in a Nation Divided
In the years leading up to the Civil War, tariff rates stabilized at a generally low, free-trade level, thanks largely to the Walker Tariff of 1846. This legislation, which served as an American counterpart to Britain’s repeal of the Corn Laws, was especially beneficial to Southern and Western agricultural groups. These interests secured even further tariff reductions in 1857 through a measure led by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Robert M.T. Hunter of Virginia.
However, this stability was soon disrupted by the Panic of 1857. Primarily sparked by global price fluctuations in agricultural markets, the economic downturn invigorated the protectionist movement, which advocated for higher tariffs as a remedy. The Panic also brought tariffs back to the forefront of national policy debates, already inflamed by the Dred Scott decision and the territorial disputes over slavery. According to historian Richard Franklin Bensel, the clash between Southern opposition to tariffs and Republican John Sherman’s protectionist stance led to a two-month impasse over the Speaker of the House role in 1858. Although Sherman was ultimately removed from consideration, he was given the chairmanship of the Ways and Means Committee, where he and Rep. Justin Morrill of Vermont introduced a new protectionist tariff proposal to replace the lower 1857 rates. This proposal became the Morrill Tariff, which, after lengthy and heated debates, passed the House in May 1860 along strict sectional lines.
Senator Robert M.T. Hunter, author of the 1857 Tariff, used his position on the Finance Committee to delay the Morrill Tariff in the Senate, ensuring it would be a campaign issue in the 1860 presidential election. His actions also postponed the Senate’s final vote on the tariff until the winter of 1860-61, placing it squarely in the “Secession Winter” session, as Southern states moved towards secession.
While the national debate over slavery in the territories took center stage in the 1860 election, the proposed Morrill Tariff became a significant focus within the Republican Party and in the Northeastern states. Lincoln’s background as a former Tariff Whig played a key role in securing his nomination at the Republican Convention in Chicago, especially in gaining the support of delegates who initially backed protectionist Senator Simon Cameron from Pennsylvania. After securing the GOP nomination, Lincoln dispatched his campaign manager, David Davis, to Pennsylvania and New Jersey with a series of pro-tariff speeches aimed at rallying protectionist voters in these critical swing states. Meanwhile, Morrill and Sherman took to the Pennsylvania campaign trail, enabling Lincoln to concentrate his efforts in the Midwest, where pro-tariff sentiments were less popular and could risk alienating potential voters. This strategic approach was highly effective, though it has rarely been highlighted.
When Congress reconvened in December for the “Secession Winter,” the atmosphere was charged, and Southern Democrats, particularly the pro-slavery “fire-eaters,” were quick to denounce Lincoln’s platform—not for abolishing slavery, but for aiming to restrict it from expanding into new territories. Amid this fiery session, the Morrill Tariff bill was introduced in the Senate, adding a new layer of tension to the already turbulent political landscape.
Tariffs and Secessionism: Unraveling the Path to Conflict
The link between the Morrill Tariff and the decision to secede has been intensely debated since 1860-61, with many of the era’s key players weighing in themselves. Initially, the question centered on whether the Morrill Tariff would pass in the final days of the outgoing Congress or in the newly composed Senate following Lincoln’s inauguration. It’s unlikely we’ll ever have a definitive answer, as the departure of senators from six secessionist states on January 21, 1861, removed crucial opposition votes, facilitating the tariff’s adoption with surprising ease just a month later.
Despite claims otherwise, including those in Loewen’s article, we know that secessionists did indeed deliberate on the tariff issue, though typically as a secondary concern to slavery. While the debates at the secession conventions of the original seven Confederate states largely centered on the territorial and slavery issues, grievances over the Morrill Tariff were occasionally vocalized. These tariffs were often framed as an additional point of contention with the North. On December 25, 1860, South Carolina’s secession convention even issued an invitation to other Southern states, citing “the consolidation of the North to rule the South, by the tariff and slavery issues” as a primary justification.
In neighboring Georgia, the debate over tariffs took on added significance. Alexander Stephens, who would later serve as the Vice President of the Confederacy, actually opposed Georgia’s move to secede, despite his later role in the Confederate government. He argued that if the South remained in the Union, it could ally with other tariff opponents from the western agricultural states to secure enough votes in the Senate to block the Morrill Tariff. Meanwhile, Senator Robert Toombs, soon to become the Confederate Secretary of State, condemned the House’s version of the Morrill Tariff as “the most atrocious tariff bill that was ever enacted,” citing its drastic increases from 20 to as much as 250 percent above the current rates. Throughout the convention, Toombs continued his attacks on the “infamous Morrill bill” and succeeded in embedding an anti-tariff clause into the pro-slavery Georgia Declaration of Causes for secession.
Considering all the evidence, it’s clear that while tariffs alone didn’t drive the secession crisis, they remain an essential piece of the puzzle. Modern historians often avoid framing tariffs as the primary cause, but entirely excluding them due to their later association with “Lost Cause” narratives risks oversimplifying the context. Tariff issues are complex, intertwined with both political strategies and economic implications, and dismissing them altogether would overlook a significant aspect of Civil War-era tensions.
A more nuanced look at the tariff question reveals its critical rise between 1858 and 1861, as sectional divisions became increasingly volatile. The tariff issue undeniably fueled these divides, especially when it reached the Senate during the “Secession Winter,” escalating the already tumultuous atmosphere. Although it doesn’t fully explain the Civil War, tariffs underscore the complexity of the conflict, revealing how economic, moral, and political factors were deeply interconnected.
Detailed Comments and Analysis
Morrill & Secession
I extend my gratitude to Prof. Loewen and all readers for joining this lively discussion. The “secession documents”—official declarations and statements by the 11 Confederate states—offer a fascinating yet intricate glimpse into the states’ perspectives during the winter of 1860-61. Slavery, without question, dominated these documents, as Mississippi’s statement illustrates clearly: “Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery…” Alongside the “Lost Cause” narrative, evaluating secondary and parallel reasons for secession is complicated by the states’ individual approaches to departure.
Unlike the U.S. Declaration of Independence, the Confederacy had no single, unified declaration articulating its motives. Instead, each state touched on common themes, particularly slavery and its expansion into new territories. However, only four of the 11 seceding states—South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas—issued extended explanations beyond brief, one-paragraph secession ordinances, and even among these, South Carolina led the charge, with other states often deferring to its lead.
Within these extended documents, South Carolina and Georgia specifically mentioned the tariff as a secondary grievance. Georgia’s Declaration of Causes included a tariff-focused passage written by Robert Toombs, while South Carolina’s Address to other states, authored by Robert Barnwell Rhett, urged solidarity in secession. Toombs’s argument in Georgia’s declaration didn’t suggest that the tariff issue had been permanently settled by the 1846 low-tariff policy but rather noted the renewed threat posed by the Morrill Tariff bill. His position echoed Rhett’s, viewing the 1860 Republican Party’s pro-tariff platform as a developing alliance between anti-slavery and protectionist agendas.
The tariff issue grew increasingly complex as the debate over secession expanded to include seven additional Southern states, with Missouri and Kentucky engaging in early talks before ultimately deciding against joining the Confederacy. Although slavery remained the central theme and none of the seven issued documents equivalent to the “Declarations” from the first four seceding states, the Morrill Tariff continued to spark intense discussions. Senators Thomas L. Clingman of North Carolina and Robert M.T. Hunter of Virginia, who remained for the final Senate vote on the Morrill Tariff, used it as a key argument to rally their states into the Confederacy, condemning the tariff up until the vote. Notably, the new Confederate government included a clause in its Constitution prohibiting protective tariffs, strongly signaling its stance on the issue. Alongside numerous pro-slavery provisions, this was one of the few substantive changes from the U.S. Constitution.
Had Southern senators not resigned, the Morrill Tariff’s fate might have been different. My research suggests that various strategies, including Hunter’s tabling motion from the spring, could have delayed a vote until the end of the lame-duck session on March 4, 1861. This approach, advocated by Alexander Stephens during Georgia’s debates, was countered by Senator Louis Wigfall of Texas in a speech interpreted as opposing Stephens’ view. Much hinged on how Northern Democrats might vote—whether they would side with protectionist Republicans, as seen in the House’s sectional vote, or with the Democratic Party’s general preference for free trade, despite minority factions favoring tariffs, including President Buchanan.
While we can only speculate, it seems likely that Southern senators could have stalled the Morrill Tariff’s passage until the end of the session in March. The new Senate, bolstered by Republican gains from the 1860 elections, along with Unionist and pro-tariff Northern Democrats, would have likely passed the bill later in the spring. Lincoln, who strongly signaled his intent to support a tariff while traveling to his inauguration, would have pushed for House reconciliation in July, with a Republican majority securing an easy passage for the Morrill Tariff. In this scenario, secession expedited the tariff’s adoption by only a few months.
If States Seceded Over Tariffs, Why Didn’t They Explicitly State It?
Of the eleven Southern states that ultimately seceded, seven did so before the Morrill Tariff was enacted. In their primary statements explaining their reasons, only Georgia even mentions tariffs. Georgia’s Report on Causes for Secession references “slave” or “slavery” 37 times, but does not include “tariff” or “tax.” As Prof. Magness points out, the report includes a passage from Toombs that addresses “interests,” where he criticizes protectionist policies “in the first years of the republic.” However, in the following paragraph, the document notes that the nation unified against protectionism with the 1846 tariff, effectively ending the tariff debate, after which Georgia’s document returns to discussing slavery.
While we cannot know with certainty how the Senate might have handled the Morrill Tariff if secession had not occurred, the available data suggests it may not have passed. Seven states did secede, and the Morrill Tariff eventually became law. However, the four states that seceded afterward did not cite the tariff as a reason. Therefore, in examining why the South seceded, I focused on the reasons they actually gave, which I still believe is the most accurate approach.